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Banks and Governments: An Arial View 
Anna Gelpern1 
 
This chapter of the Liber Amicorum considers the relationship between banking and 
sovereign debt crises since the 1980s.  
 
Introduction: Font Matters 
 
1.1 It has been a distinctive yet unremarked upon pattern: each time European officials unveil 
bold new measures to end the Crisis, a few draft pages in Arial 12 font appear on SSRN. 
Within hours, the draft is downloaded thousands of times, sending ripples across the 
blogosphere before lodging in a pink paper column and in the side of said officials. The 
authors, Lee Buchheit and Mitu Gulati, make roughly the same argument each time: policy 
makers have three to five options to solve the problem before them. One of these does more 
harm than good. Coincidentally, it is the chosen one. The draft then charts a path out of the 
hole. Sometimes officials take the path—eventually2—at other times, they keep digging. 
 
1.2 The duo’s latest intervention followed the launch of a program for Cyprus.3  The Cypriot 
banking system was eight times the size of the island’s economy and tottering on the brink 
from exposure to Greece. As a condition of financing the government, Europe insisted that 
bank depositors pay a burden-sharing “tax.” The tax would contain the crisis in the banking 
sector and spare the holders of government bonds. The announcement would showcase 
Europe’s commitment to share losses with private creditors, and to break the bond between 
banks and national governments. 
 
1.3 It took three pages in Lee Buchheit’s trademark font to demolish the plan and lay out an 
alternative. What came to be called “the botched Cyprus bailout” was doomed from the start: 
after paying the deposit tax, people would have pulled the rest of their savings, brought down 
the banking system and forced the government to intervene on a much larger scale. Buchheit 
and Gulati instead proposed to extend uninsured deposits over EUR100, 000 into five and 
ten-year certificates of deposit, and to reschedule EUR8.2 billion in government debt. This 
combination would have filled more than half of the program financing gap without touching 
the insured depositors. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Georgetown	  Law	  and	  Peterson	  Institute	  for	  International	  Economics;	  portions	  of	  this	  contribution	  have	  appeared	  
in	  Foreign	  Policy	  Association	  Great	  Decisions	  2011	  and	  on	  CreditSlips.org.	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  the	  many	  colleagues	  who	  
have	  commented	  on	  early	  versions	  of	  this	  paper,	  to	  the	  editors	  of	  this	  volume,	  and	  to	  Will	  Chamberlain	  for	  
valuable	  research	  assistance.	  
2	  See,	  e.g.,	  Jeromin	  Zettelmeyer	  et	  al.,	  The	  Greek	  Debt	  Exchange:	  An	  Autopsy	  33	  (September	  11,	  2012)	  (working	  
paper)	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144932;	  Lee	  C.	  Buchheit	  &	  G.	  Mitu	  Gulati,	  How	  to	  
Restructure	  Greek	  Debt	  7-­‐10	  (May	  7,	  2010)	  (working	  paper).	  
3	  See	  Lee	  C.	  Buchheit	  &	  G.	  Mitu	  Gulati,	  Walking	  Back	  from	  Cyprus	  (March	  8,	  2013)	  (working	  paper)	  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2235359.	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1.4 Their prescription flowed from the insight that governments and financial systems are 
communicating vessels: strength or weakness in one flows to the other, and back. My essay 
elaborates the implications of this insight. I consider the bank-government link in recent 
financial crises. It is far from unique to Europe, though it does not always result in feedback 
effects, or the “doom loop,” which has made headlines of late. As capital movements have 
become more rapid and global, the abiding connection between banks and governments has 
turned destructive. The policy goal is to reduce the risk of destruction and harness the 
connection in the name of financial stability. In conclusion, I suggest several policy 
implications and avenues for further research. 
 
I. Far from Europe 
 
1.5 On January 27, 2011, Standard & Poor’s downgraded Japan’s government debt, which then 
stood at nearly double the size of the Japanese economy.4  The Prime Minister apparently 
learned about the downgrade from a foreign journalist.  His flub instantly became iconic—
but it was also overblown:  the downgrade had little meaning for most of Japan’s creditors. 
For regulated domestic financial institutions, holding almost 70% of Japanese government 
bonds, for government pension funds, and for the Japanese central bank, there were few 
practical consequences from the S&P pronouncement. At the extreme, the value of the debt 
to these creditors was a function of regulatory say-so, and their prospects of repayment a 
function of domestic politics.  Only foreigners, holding just over 5%, might have had reason 
to listen to S&P.5 
 
1.6 This anecdote is at once happy, sad, and symptomatic of an old relationship at the heart of 
modern finance. It is about banks and governments, which are both inseparable and doomed 
to bring each other down.  On the bright side, they are each other’s indispensable safety net.  
On the dark side, government debt default can ravage financial systems, and banking crises 
can bring down governments. 
 
1.7 Until recently, bank and government debt problems were seen as related, but distinct. 
Banking crises were bad for the economy and hence for public finances.6 Rulers running 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Japan	  (Unsolicited	  Rating),	  STANDARD	  &	  POOR’S,	  http://www.standardandpoors.com	  (Apr.	  2,	  2011)	  (indicating	  the	  
Jan.	  27,	  2011	  credit	  rating	  downgrade	  to	  AA-­‐);	  see	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  [IMF],	  Japan:	  Staff	  Report	  for	  the	  
2010	  Article	  IV	  Consultation,	  at	  27,	  32,	  IMF	  Country	  Report	  No.	  10/211	  (July,	  2010);	  Lindsay	  Whipp	  &	  Mure	  Dickie,	  
S&P	  downgrades	  Japan	  on	  debt	  worries,	  FINANCIAL	  TIMES,	  Jan.	  27,	  2011,	  available	  at	  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/095efb70-­‐29f3-­‐11e0-­‐997c-­‐00144feab49a.html#axzz1I5eYizo3.	  
5	  Whipp	  &	  Dickie,	   supra	  note	  4;	   See	  Ministry	  of	   Finance	  of	   Japan,	  Debt	  Management	  Report	   2010,	  Ch.	   3	   at	   20,	  
available	  at	  http://www.mof.go.jp.	  
6	  See,	  e.g.,	  	  CARMEN	  M.	  REINHART	  &	  KENNETH	  S.	  ROGOFF,	  THIS	  TIME	  IS	  DIFFERENT:	  EIGHT	  CENTURIES	  OF	  FINANCIAL	  FOLLY	  141-­‐73	  
(2009);	  Ben	  S.	  Bernanke,	  Nonmonetary	  Effects	  of	  the	  Financial	  Crisis	  in	  the	  Great	  Depression,	  73	  AM.	  ECON.	  REV.	  257,	  
263-­‐67	  (1983).	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short on funds have turned to banks since time immemorial, which did not imply the death of 
regulated institutions, nor the start of a self-destructive spiral. Bank and government debt 
crises traveled along distinct paths, required different prophylactic measures ex ante and 
different solutions ex post. For modern banks, solvency regulation has been the principal 
bulwark against failure; resolution the principal way to limit collateral damage from failure. 
For governments, fiscal fiscal prudence has been the accepted prophylactic; adjustment (belt-
tightening) and debt restructuring, the standard solutions. 
 
1.8 The five case studies below reveal the blurry boundary between bank and government crises. 
In Asia, Europe, and the Americas, events now known as either banking or government debt 
crises often had elements of both. Some could have gone either way; policy and political 
choices determined their path. In all cases governments were as indispensable for resolving 
banking crises, as banks were for resolving sovereign debt crises. More recently, the 
feedback loop between bank and sovereign distress appears to have intensified, prompting 
calls for radical measures to break the bank-government link. Some of the measures proposed 
so far may adjust, elaborate, or displace the link; none would break it. 
 
II. Banks or Governments 
 
1.9 Accounts of banking crises start with a credit boom, where private institutions (perhaps 
operating under loose monetary conditions) make imprudent loans financed by fragile short-
term borrowing.7 An economic downturn might deliver a shock to bank assets; market 
conditions might make it impossible for banks as a group to roll over maturing liabilities. 
Policy makers then face a choice: to let private losses fall where they may, to redistribute 
them among private actors, to absorb some losses on behalf of their taxpayers, or to make 
them a problem for another government. 
 
A. Korea 1997 
 
1.10 Korea’s was a traditional banking crisis story. Its banks had borrowed from abroad to finance 
risky domestic corporate loan portfolios. When the currency crisis in Thailand and Indonesia 
spread to Korea in late 1997, the banks could not roll over their short-term debts to foreign 
financial institutions. As they repaid these foreign loans, the banks drained Korea’s hard 
currency reserves. A blanket government guarantee of all bank liabilities failed to stem the 
outflow. At year-end, finance officials in Europe, Japan, and the United States had to cajole 
their banks to renew loans to Korean banks to avoid imminent default.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  REINHART	  &	  ROGOFF,	  supra	  note	  6	  at	  144-­‐45.	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1.11 By then, more than half of all Korean banks were operating with insufficient capital.8 At the 
height of the crisis in 1998, close to a third of all Korean firms were insolvent; more than half 
were illiquid.9 Also in 1998, foreign lenders agreed to a formal restructuring of their claims 
on Korean banks. In exchange, they got debt guaranteed by the government of Korea. By 
October 2000, the government absorbed resolution costs to the tune of 22% of GDP.10  
 
1.12 Despite this extraordinary spending, Korea’s government exited the crisis with debt at 18% 
of GDP: double the pre-crisis level of 9%, but still very low by international standards.11 The 
Korean banking crisis did not bring down public finances in part because government debt 
was low at the outset, the size of the banking sector was manageable in retrospect,12 and the 
economy’s growth potential was high.13 
 
1.13 The Asian financial crisis is usually described as originating in the private corporate and 
financial sectors. Poor lending and borrowing decisions by banks left countries like Korea 
exposed to external shocks that demanded government intervention. On the other hand, it is 
also true that bank lending and borrowing practices channeled government economic 
policy.14 Although bank debts did not bankrupt the Korean national treasury, they did nearly 
drain the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves.15 Breathing space for the eventual 
restructuring came courtesy of foreign governments using “moral suasion” to maintain their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Ajai	  Chopra	  et	  al.,	  From	  Crisis	  to	  Recovery	  in	  Korea:	  Strategy,	  Achievements,	  and	  Lessons	  38	  (Working	  Paper	  of	  the	  
International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  No.	  01/154,	  2001),	  available	  at	  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp01154.pdf.	  
9	  Stijn	  Claessens	  et	  al.,	  Corporate	  Distress	  in	  East	  Asia,	  PUBLIC	  POLICY	  FOR	  THE	  PRIVATE	  SECTOR	  (World	  Bank,	  Washington,	  
D.C.),	  January	  1999,	  at	  1	  tbl.1,	  available	  at	  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/282884-­‐1303327122200/172claes.pdf.	  
10	  Chopra	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  44.	  
11	  World	  Economic	  Outlook	  Database,	  INT’L	  MONETARY	  FUND	  (April	  2013),	  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx	  (select	  “Advanced	  Economies”	  
country	  group;	  then	  click	  “Clear	  All”	  and	  select	  “Korea”;	  then	  select	  “General	  government	  gross	  debt	  –	  Percent	  of	  
GDP”;	  select	  “Start	  Year”	  of	  1995	  and	  “End	  Year”	  of	  2000;	  then	  click	  “Prepare	  Report”).	  
12	  Commercial	  bank	  assets	  stood	  over	  150%	  of	  GDP	  in	  Korea	  in	  1996,	  compared	  to	  136%	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  at	  
the	  time.	  Carl-­‐Johan	  Lindgren,	  et	  al.,	  Financial	  Crisis	  and	  Restructuring:	  Lessons	  from	  Asia	  11,	  13	  box	  3	  (1999),	  
available	  at	  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/opfinsec/op188.pdf	  .	  	  By	  2011,	  bank	  assets	  in	  Europe	  were	  
closer	  to	  300%	  of	  GDP,	  and	  exceeded	  700%	  in	  Cyprus	  and	  Ireland.	  Stefano	  Borgioli	  Et	  al.,	  Financial	  Stability	  Analysis	  
–	  Insights	  Gained	  From	  Consolidated	  Banking	  Data	  For	  the	  EU	  15	  chart	  1,	  available	  at	  
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp140.pdf;	  Int’l	  Monetary	  Fund,	  European	  Union:	  Publication	  of	  Financial	  
Assessment	  Porgram	  Documentation	  6	  (IMF	  Country	  Report	  No.	  13/67,	  Mar.	  2013)	  	  available	  at	  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr1367.pdf.	  
13	  See	  Chopra	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  76-­‐77	  &	  tbl.10.	  See	  also	  Ashoka	  Mody	  &	  Damiano	  Sandri,	  The	  Eurozone	  Crisis:	  
How	  Banks	  and	  Sovereigns	  Came	  to	  be	  Joined	  at	  the	  Hip,	  27	  ECON.	  POL’Y	  199,	  206	  (2012)	  (weak	  growth	  prospects	  
can	  intensify	  banking	  crises)	  
14	  See	  Chopra,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  8-­‐10.	  
15	  See	  Mark	  Allen,	  et	  al.,	  A	  Balance	  Sheet	  Approach	  to	  the	  Financial	  Crisis	  17-­‐18	  (IMF	  Working	  Paper	  02/210,	  
December	  2002)	  available	  at	  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp02210.pdf.	  See	  also	  PAUL	  BLUSTEIN,	  
THE	  CHASTENING	  124-­‐27	  (2001).	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own banks’ exposure to Korea.16 The story shifts easily from one of a private sector crisis 
and exceptional public intervention to one of long-term symbiosis and mutual assured 
destruction. It is also a transnational story, where governments across jurisdictions leverage 
their relationships with regulated institutions for the sake of financial stability. 
 
1.14 A decade on, Korea’s ability to cushion the fall of its banks looked unusual, almost quaint. 
 
B. Iceland 2008 
 
1.15 Between 2003 and 2007, Iceland—a country of about 300,000 inhabitants and an economy of 
about $12 billion—transformed from a fishing hub into a major international financial center. 
It had five main commercial banks, of which the three largest (accounting for 90% of the 
banking system) borrowed tens of billions of dollars short-term on the international capital 
markets. Unchecked by regulators, they amassed speculative and illiquid investments abroad. 
In 2004–2006, these banks sought to diversify their funding sources and expand their retail 
deposit base.17 Buoyed by permissive cross-border expansion rules in the European 
Economic Area,18 they attracted deposits from a wide range of sources, including local 
governments in Britain and retirees in the Netherlands; however, the bulk of Icelandic bank 
funding still came from the wholesale capital markets. Bank assets grew from roughly equal 
to over ten times the size of the economy in just three years. More than half were abroad, but 
even assets in Iceland were nearly four times the size of the economy on the eve of the crisis. 
Over 80% of bank liabilities and just under 80% of their assets were denominated in foreign 
currencies.19 
 
1.16 When global financial markets collapsed in the fall of 2008, the currency fell by 40%, the 
banks could no longer refinance their debts, and were taken over by the government 
beginning October 6. The legislature enacted emergency measures authorizing the 
government to “ring fence” domestic assets and liabilities of the banking system, and 
retroactively granted depositors preference over other bank creditors. Fearing losses to U.K. 
depositors, the U.K. government famously invoked antiterrorism legislation to freeze 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  See	  PAUL	  BLUSTEIN,	  THE	  CHASTENING	  192-­‐202	  (2001).	  
17	  See	  Int’l	  Monetary	  Fund,	  Iceland:	  2008	  Article	  IV	  Consultation	  4	  box	  1	  (IMF	  Country	  Report	  No.	  08/367,	  
December	  2008),	  available	  at	  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08367.pdf.	  
18	  House	  of	  Commons	  Treasury	  Committee,	  Banking	  Crisis:	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Icelandic	  banks	  ¶¶	  110-­‐
11	  (April	  4,	  2009),	  available	  at	  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/402/402.pdf.	  EEA	  comprises	  EU	  
member	  states	  plus	  Iceland,	  Norway	  and	  Liechtenstein.	  
19	  See	  Int’l	  Monetary	  Fund,	  Iceland:	  2008	  Article	  IV	  Consultation	  3,	  28	  tbl.3	  (IMF	  Country	  Report	  No.	  08/367,	  
December	  2008),	  available	  at	  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08367.pdf.	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Icelandic bank assets in the United Kingdom, accelerating wholesale collapse of the banking 
sector in Iceland.20 Iceland’s government fell shortly thereafter.  
 
1.17 With the IMF’s blessing, the authorities imposed capital controls and proceeded to 
restructure the banks. Some smaller ones were sold or liquidated; the largest were split along 
national lines. Three new banks established with government capital got the domestic assets 
and domestic liabilities; the old failed banks retained the foreign assets and liabilities. 
Domestic deposits received a blanket government guarantee. Some foreign creditors of the 
old banks were able to swap their debt into new bank equity. Government debt went from 
30% to 120% of GDP, mostly owing to economic contraction from the crisis.21 Net direct 
costs of bank restructuring have been estimated at about 20% of GDP, attributable in 
important part to central bank financing for the banking system on the eve of the crisis.22 
Negotiations over allocating the losses continue five years later; some foreign creditors stand 
to lose nearly all of their investment.23 
 
1.18 In retrospect, the fall looks inevitable. Iceland started out with low government debt; but no 
government can guarantee liabilities remotely approaching ten times the size of its economy, 
and no central bank can hold enough foreign currency to finance capital outflows on the scale 
threatening Iceland. When the government could not compensate everyone, it chose to pay its 
own citizens ahead of foreign creditors, including ordinary Europeans who put money in 
Iceland’s banks. 
 
1.19 The U.K. and Dutch governments were unwilling to see their nationals lose hard-earned 
savings in Iceland. They compensated their depositors, and sued Iceland’s government for 
compensation—a bid to turn bank debt (deposits) into sovereign debt.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  See	  Althingi	  Special	  Investigation	  Commission,	  Causes	  of	  the	  Collapse	  of	  the	  Icelandic	  Banks	  –	  Responsibility,	  
Mistakes,	  and	  Negligence	  89	  (April	  12,	  2010)	  available	  at	  
http://www.rna.is/media/skjol/RNAvefurKafli21Enska.pdf;	  	  House	  of	  Commons	  Treasury	  Committee,	  Banking	  
Crisis:	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Icelandic	  banks	  ¶¶	  41-­‐42	  (April	  4,	  2009),	  available	  at	  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/402/402.pdf.	  
21	  Int’l	  Monetary	  Fund,	  Iceland:	  2010	  Article	  IV	  Consultation	  33	  tbl.7	  (IMF	  Country	  Report	  No.	  10/305,	  October	  
2010)	  available	  at	  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10305.pdf;	  	  Int’l	  Monetary	  Fund,	  Iceland:	  Ex	  
Post	  Evaluation	  of	  Exceptional	  Access	  Under	  the	  2008	  Stand-­‐by	  Arrangement	  14	  available	  at	  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1291.pdf.	  
22	  Int’l	  Monetary	  Fund,	  Iceland:	  2010	  Article	  IV	  Consultation	  33	  tbl.7	  (IMF	  Country	  Report	  No.	  10/305,	  October	  
2010)	  available	  at	  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10305.pdf;	  	  Int’l	  Monetary	  Fund,	  Iceland:	  Ex	  
Post	  Evaluation	  of	  Exceptional	  Access	  Under	  the	  2008	  Stand-­‐by	  Arrangement	  14	  available	  at	  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1291.pdf.	  	  See	  also	  Friõrik	  Már	  Baldursson,	  Iceland’s	  programme	  
with	  the	  IMF	  2008-­‐11,	  Vox	  (Nov.	  8,	  2011)	  http://www.voxeu.org/article/iceland-­‐s-­‐programme-­‐imf-­‐2008-­‐11.	  
23	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  Iceland:	  Ex	  Post	  Evaluation	  of	  Exceptional	  Access	  Under	  the	  2008	  Stand-­‐by	  
Arrangement,	  IMF	  Country	  Report	  No.	  12/91	  April	  2012,	  pp.13-­‐14,	  19.	  	  Available	  at	  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1291.pdf;	  see	  also	  Richard	  Milne,	  Iceland’s	  Creditors	  Braced	  for	  
Losses,	  Financial	  Times,	  May	  2,	  2013,	  http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/298407e8-­‐b19a-­‐11e2-­‐b324-­‐
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2VNIxdAlC.	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1.20 In 2013, the European Free Trade Area court rebuffed their claims.24  It ruled that Iceland’s 
treaty obligations were limited to establishing a deposit insurance scheme; funding the 
scheme was another matter. The upshot of the decision was that Icelandic banks had every 
right to take deposits across Europe with a private and utterly underfunded deposit insurance 
scheme; creditors took the risk and paid the price.25 While many observers decried the 
court’s formalistic approach,26 others greeted the decision as a strike against bailouts.27 From 
now on, they said, private creditors would have to live with the consequences of their 
investment decisions. 
 
1.21 It was a stretch to describe the ruling as a victory for private responsibility. Although some 
bank creditors will surely suffer large losses, this group of depositors was rescued by a 
different cast of government characters. Rather than adding to Iceland’s debt stock, the 
liabilities migrated from Iceland’s onto U.K. and Dutch government books. 
 
1.22 In late 2008, Iceland seemed like an anomaly – its private banking sector had grown so 
monstrously large so quickly that it simply swallowed up the country, government and all. It 
did so using a quirk in the European treaty framework, which did not require countries to 
fund or backstop deposit insurance, and which was subsequently validated by a court’s 
reading of the treaties.  
 
1.23 The dramatic details obscure the ways in which Iceland was rather ordinary. Outsize banking 
sectors have become the norm in Europe, with assets at more than three times the size of 
national economies on average.28 Offshore financial centers like Cyprus and Switzerland 
have banking sectors far bigger than the average;29 Luxembourg’s banks dwarf the rest at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  See	  Case	  E-­‐16/11,	  EFTA	  Surveillance	  Authority	  v.	  Iceland,	  2013	  WestlawNext	  ¶	  178	  (Jan	  28,	  2013).	  
25	  See	  Case	  E-­‐16/11,	  EFTA	  Surveillance	  Authority	  v.	  Iceland,	  2013	  WestlawNext	  ¶	  19-­‐23	  (Jan	  28,	  2013).	  
26	  See,	  e.g.,	  Tim	  Young,	  Editorial,	  EFTA	  Court’s	  Icesave	  Ruling	  Leaves	  European	  Deposit	  Insurance	  in	  Tatters,	  CENTRAL	  
BANKING,	  Jan.	  31,	  2013,	  http://www.centralbanking.com/central-­‐banking/opinion/2240651/opinion-­‐efta-­‐courts-­‐
icesave-­‐ruling-­‐leaves-­‐european-­‐deposit-­‐insurance-­‐in-­‐tatters.	  
27	  See,	  e.g.,	  Editorial,	  Saga	  ends	  with	  Icesave	  Redemption,	  FINANCIAL	  TIMES,	  Jan.	  29,	  2013,	  
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/78b96684-­‐6a21-­‐11e2-­‐a80c-­‐00144feab49a.html#axzz2VNIxdAlC.	  
28	  See	  European	  Central	  Bank,	  EU	  Banking	  Structures	  10	  chart	  3	  (September	  2010)	  available	  at	  
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/eubankingstructures201009en.pdf	  
29Compare	  Aggregated	  balance	  sheet	  of	  euro	  area	  monetary	  financial	  institutions,	  excluding	  the	  Eurosystem:	  
December	  2012,	  EUROPEAN	  CENTRAL	  BANK,	  
http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/aggregates/bsheets/html/outstanding_amounts_2012-­‐12.en.html	  (last	  visited	  
June	  8,	  2013)	  (showing	  that	  Cypriot	  Banks	  held	  total	  assets	  of	  128.1	  billion	  Euros	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2012)	  and	  Swiss	  
National	  Bank,	  Monthly	  Bulletin	  of	  Banking	  Statistics	  28	  (February	  2013)	  (showing	  that	  Swiss	  banks	  held	  total	  
assets	  of	  2.83	  trillion	  Swiss	  Francs)	  with	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  World	  Economic	  Outlook	  Database,	  April	  
2013	  (showing	  that	  Cyprus’	  2012	  GDP	  was	  14.8	  billion	  euros	  and	  Switzerland’s	  2012	  GDP	  was	  548	  billion	  Swiss	  
Francs.)	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nearly twenty times the size of the economy.30 These are products of economic policy choice 
and regulation as much or more than they are market mutations. Similarly, while Iceland’s 
deposit insurance scheme might seem laughable in retrospect, few funded schemes can 
withstand complete collapse of the banking system. And as the EFTA court noted, once the 
system collapses, governments choose how they go about restructuring, even if it means 
stiffing the foreigners in favor of their own voters. The fact that governments will rescue 
their people and institutions, but try to stick other governments with the bill is also hardly 
unusual. Crises from Mexico in 1982 to the United States in 2008 saw policy makers 
debating whether and how to push losses from their financial institutions onto other people’s 
taxpayers.31 
 
III.  Governments or Banks 
 
1.24 It generally takes a big banking sector to bring down a national treasury. Loss on relatively 
small holdings of public debt can wipe out bank equity. This is because compared to other 
firms, banks are thinly capitalized.32 If banking system capital is at 8% of risk-weighted 
assets, a default on government debt, or even a big drop in its value, can quickly leave the 
system undercapitalized and many banks insolvent.  
 
1.25 Government debt stood at over 10% of banking system assets in six out of the 24 high-
income countries last surveyed by the IMF, with Japan leading the pack at nearly 25% and 
Italy at nearly 15%, in line with Greece before its debt restructuring.33 The United States was 
not one of the six, but would easily make the list if bank holdings of Government Sponsored 
Enterprise debt were included.34 All U.S. government obligations stood at more than 13% of 
the assets in the U.S. banking system in March 2013. In developing countries where capital 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  STEFANO	  BORGIOLI	  ET	  AL.,	  FINANCIAL	  STABILITY	  ANALYSIS	  –	  INSIGHTS	  GAINED	  FROM	  CONSOLIDATED	  BANKING	  DATA	  FOR	  THE	  EU	  15	  
chart	  1	  (2013)	  available	  at	  http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp140.pdf	  
31	  See	  Report	  of	  Anton	  R.	  Valukas,	  Examiner	  at	  703-­‐10,	  In	  re	  Lehman	  Bros.	  Holdings	  Inc.,	  439	  B.R.	  811	  (S.D.N.Y.	  
2010)	  (No.	  08-­‐13555(JMP))	  (discussing	  Lehman);	  Congressional	  Oversight	  Panel,	  June	  Oversight	  Report:	  The	  AIG	  
Rescue,	  Its	  Impact	  on	  Markets,	  and	  the	  Government’s	  Exit	  Strategy	  92-­‐93	  (June	  10,	  2010)	  (discussing	  AIG).	  
32	  See	  generally	  ANAT	  ADMATI	  AND	  MARTIN	  HELLWIG,	  THE	  BANKERS’	  NEW	  CLOTHES	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press	  
2013)	  (discussing	  why	  banks	  have	  higher	  leverage	  than	  other	  firms).	  	  
33	  See	  INT’L	  MONETARY	  FUND,	  GLOBAL	  FINANCIAL	  STABILITY	  REPORT	  133	  fig.3.7	  (2013),	  available	  at	  
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2013/01/pdf/text.pdf.	  See	  also	  Serkan	  Aslanalp	  and	  Takahiro	  Tsuda,	  
Tracking	  Global	  Demand	  for	  Advanced	  Economy	  Sovereign	  Debt	  32	  fig.15	  (Int’l.	  Monetary	  Fund,	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  
12/284,	  December	  2012)	  available	  at	  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12284.pdf	  32	  fig.15.	  
34	  FDIC	  statistics	  for	  Government-­‐Sponsored	  Enterprises	  cover	  the	  Federal	  National	  Mortgage	  Association,	  the	  
Federal	  Home	  Loan	  Mortgage	  Corporation,	  the	  Federal	  Home	  Loan	  Bank	  System,	  the	  Farm	  Credit	  Banks,	  the	  Banks	  
for	  Cooperatives,	  the	  Federal	  Agricultural	  Mortgage	  Corporation,	  the	  Student	  Loan	  Marketing	  Association,	  the	  
College	  Construction	  Loan	  Insurance	  Association,	  and	  any	  of	  their	  affiliated	  or	  member	  institutions,	  and	  any	  other	  
Government-­‐sponsored	  enterprise	  as	  designated	  by	  the	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Treasury.	  	  See	  12	  U.S.C.	  §	  1828(s)(5)	  
(2013)	  (citing	  Financial	  Institutions	  Reform,	  Recovery,	  and	  Enforcement	  Act	  (FIRREA)	  of	  1989,	  sec.	  1404(e)(1)(A),	  
Pub.	  L.	  No.	  101-­‐73,	  103	  Stat.	  183).	  Investors	  have	  long	  bought	  the	  debt	  of	  GSE’s	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  debt	  of	  the	  
Federal	  Government	  even	  before	  the	  takeovers	  of	  Fannie	  Mae	  and	  Freddie	  Mac	  in	  2008.	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market is shallow and lending to the private sector limited, government securities may be the 
only game in town. 
 
1.26 Bank holdings of government debt often increase in the run-up to financial crisis.35 Like 
other investors, banks may see government debt as a safe haven in times of market 
turbulence and risk aversion; they may also come under pressure from the government to act 
as its lenders of last resort when all other creditors have left. For example, U.S. bank 
holdings of U.S. Treasury securities nearly doubled between 2008 and 2010 according to 
Federal Reserve data. Portuguese bank lending to the Portuguese government more than 
doubled in the two years preceding its turn to the IMF.36  
 
1.27 Regulation and supervision can help obscure—or soften—the impact of public debt problems 
on the financial sector. Where they applied in ordinary times, borrower concentration limits 
and activities restrictions might be suspended; asset values might perk up from a newly 
discovered accounting treatment; and wafer-thin capital cushions may be deemed good 
enough under the circumstances.  
 
1.28 Argentina’s last crisis offers a particularly rich case study of government debt in the banking 
system, and the way in which direct financial involvement by the government can interact 
with regulation on bank balance sheets. 
 
A. Argentina 2001 
 
1.29 To most outside observers, Argentina’s government debt default in late 2001 subsumed and 
overshadowed its banking crisis. Quite apart from their exposure to sovereign credit risk, 
banks were vulnerable to the effects of economic contraction and currency depreciation: if 
the peso’s 1:1 peg to the U.S. dollar broke down, bank borrowers’ wealth would shrink, and 
their mammoth books of dollar loans would go into default. But the government presented a 
distinct source of danger for the banks. 
 
1.30 At the height of the crisis, Argentina’s public debt ratios were several times the size of 
Korea’s or Iceland’s.37 Despite a succession of bank runs in the year before default, the 
government relied on domestic banks and pension funds, along with funding from the IMF, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Serkan	  Arslanalp	  &	  Takahiro	  Tsuda,	  Tracking	  Global	  Demand	  for	  Advanced	  Economy	  Sovereign	  Debt	  31-­‐32	  &	  
fig.14-­‐15	  (IMF	  Working	  Paper	  12/284,	  December	  2012)	  available	  at	  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12284.pdf.	  
36	  Banco	  de	  Portugal,	  Statistical	  Bulletin	  tbl.B.3.7.1	  clmn.11	  (May	  2013),	  available	  at	  http://www.bportugal.pt/en-­‐
US/Estatisticas/PublicacoesEstatisticas/BolEstatistico/Publications/B3.pdf.	  According	  to	  press	  reports	  at	  the	  time,	  
the	  turn	  to	  the	  IMF	  was	  apparently	  prompted	  by	  something	  of	  a	  buyers’	  strike	  among	  domestic	  institutions.	  
37	  See	  Int’l	  Monetary	  Fund,	  Argentina:	  2002	  Article	  IV	  Consultation	  (IMF	  Country	  Report	  No.	  03/226,	  July	  2003)	  
available	  at	  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03226.pdf.	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to fill its growing financing gap. Bank credit to the public sector doubled as foreign creditors 
ran for the hills, while credit to the private sector shrank.  The $5.1 billion that Argentina 
borrowed from the IMF that year helped sustain the wobbling currency peg amid rampant 
capital flight: domestic depositors moved $16 billion offshore; short-term external creditors 
of the banks pulled another $13.4 billion.38 Banks’ sources of funding shrank, as their 
vulnerability to government default grew. 
 
1.31 Argentina could have used IMF borrowing to cushion the impact of devaluation and public 
debt restructuring on local banks.39 Instead, it gambled for resurrection, apparently at the 
banks’ expense. By the end of 2001, the government needed bank holidays and capital 
controls to keep the remaining deposits in the banking system. After default, the government 
continued to use banks to cushion the effects of the crisis on other parts of the economy: for 
example, it converted dollar loans and deposits into pesos at asymmetric rates, so that bank 
owners faced a 40% gap between their assets and liabilities. It eventually filled the gap with 
new government bonds, which enjoyed favorable regulatory treatment and were serviced 
while foreign bonds remained in default.40 The approach helped debtors; it also reflected the 
government’s unwillingness to nationalize the banking system when bank owners threatened 
to walk away. 
 
1.32 In sum, a depression, a currency collapse, and a government debt crisis together helped bring 
down Argentina’s banks. Regulation and supervision allowed the government to finance 
itself from the banks when no other private creditors would lend to it. On the other hand, 
more regulatory forbearance and new government debt issued post-default kept the banking 
system on life support while the economy recovered, until deposits could be freed without 
risking a run. When the government was ready to restructure its foreign debt, domestic banks 
that held about half of it helped boost creditor participation.  
 
1.33 In Korea, the government stood behind Korean banks and their foreign creditors. In Iceland 
and Argentina, foreign creditors of the banks and the sovereign, respectively, absorbed losses 
from the combined bank-government insolvency. In all cases, loss allocation was an iterative 
process involving multiple political actors, stretching over multiple regulatory cycles.  
 
B. The Third World Debt Crisis1982 
 
1.34 What came to be known as the “Third World debt crisis” of the 1980s could have—but did 
not—become the “First World banking crisis” to rival the Great Depression. Between August 
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1982 and October 1983, 28 governments from Latin America, Africa, Asia and Eastern 
Europe suspended payments and initiated rescheduling talks over their obligations to 
commercial banks in the U.S., the U.K. and Germany, among others. In 1982, when Mexico 
initiated the wave of suspensions and restructurings, loans to the most heavily indebted 
governments represented over 130% of all capital in U.S. banks, 85% of all capital in British 
banks, and over 31% of all capital in German banks.41 The nine largest U.S. banks were 
exposed to the tune of 194% of their capital; over 44% for Mexico alone.  
 
1.35 Like other banking crises, this one originated with a credit bubble. The oil price shocks in the 
1970s led to spikes in dollar revenues of energy-exporting countries, and a corresponding rise 
in “petrodollar deposits” in major financial center banks. The banks invested the deposits in 
high-yielding loans to governments and private sector borrowers in developing countries. In 
the early 1980s, a global recession and rising interest rates in the United States made it 
impossible for developing-country borrowers to refinance these dollar debts. At the same 
time, banks in major financial centers were under stress, their capital worn thin with 
recession, and their loan-loss provisions too low to absorb the looming defaults. 
 
1.36 Sovereign debtors and their creditors’ governments faced a dilemma: if the debtors defaulted 
or pursued debt principal reduction, major banks in the United States and Europe would have 
been exposed overnight as insolvent, potentially triggering deposit runs, economic and social 
dislocation in creditors’ countries. If the banks’ home governments and principal regulators 
had pursued early debt restructuring, they would have had to backstop their banks to mitigate 
the consequences. Instead, the creditors’ governments helped broker negotiated arrangements 
with each debtor, whereby bank syndicates refinanced sovereign debts as if they were dealing 
with a temporary liquidity problem. The debtors also received financing from multilateral 
creditors and promised policy reform. Such arrangements had to be renegotiated frequently, 
adding to the sovereign debt stock: foreign bank claims on the most heavily indebted 
countries went up by nearly one third between 1982 and 1987, while economic growth 
stagnated. Over the same period, banks in New York, London and Frankfurt were rebuilding 
capital and provisions.42 
 
1.37 The tide turned in 1989, when the idea that developing-country debt stocks were 
unsustainable became actionable and politically acceptable: banks could absorb principal 
write-downs with relatively modest regulatory forbearance. In March of that year, U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady gave a famous speech where he recognized publicly 
for the first time that full debt repayment would stunt growth in these debtor countries; this 
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  WILLIAM	  CLINE,	  INTERNATIONAL	  DEBT	  REEXAMINED,	  Tables	  2.10-­‐2.12	  (1995).	  
42	  WILLIAM	  CLINE,	  INTERNATIONAL	  DEBT	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signaled major policy change on loss allocation.43 His initiative led to restructuring 
agreements with substantial principal reduction, led again by Mexico, including the 
forgiveness in total of some $60 billion in debt,44 much of which fell on banks and their 
shareholders.45 Debt relief was conditioned on dramatic economic reforms including large-
scale privatization and liberalization in many developing countries. 
 
1.38 The delay in principal reductions and the resulting long-term costs for debtors’ economies 
was a function of many complex factors. However, there is little doubt that the health of 
leading international commercial banks was a key factor in treating the crisis as one of 
temporary borrower illiquidity. The burden of debt distress initially fell on the debtors in the 
form of higher debt stocks and domestic economic adjustment, and only later on the banks in 
the form of debt write-offs. As in other crises, loss allocation among banks and governments 
took multiple iterations ofregulatory forbearance, public financing, and inter-government 
negotiation. 
 
III.  Back to Europe (The Doom Loop) 
 
1.39 The Eurozone crisis has made the distinction between banking and public debt crises hard to 
sustain. The combination of very large national banking sectors, strained fiscal resources, 
financial integration, and the inability of national governments to print money have made it 
virtually impossible for member states to contain crises in their banks or limit the impact of 
government debt distress on the banking systems.46 Persistent home bias in sovereign debt 
holdings helped make national banking systems in the most vulnerable member states 
especially exposed to their governments’ debt distress.47 However, banks can fall victim to 
their sovereigns’ debt problems even where they do not hold too much of their government’s 
debt: to the extent markets counted on national governments to back their banks, weak public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	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  F.	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  of	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  Brookings	  Institution	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  the	  Bretton	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Committee	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  17	  (1995).	  
45	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  From	  1989	  to	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  INT’L	  L.J.	  1802,	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  See	  e.g.,	  Maurice	  Obstfeld,	  Finance	  at	  Center	  Stage:	  Some	  Lessons	  of	  the	  Euro	  Crisis	  (Working	  Paper,	  March	  
2013)	  available	  at	  http://www.princeton.edu/economics/seminar-­‐schedule-­‐by-­‐prog/macro-­‐
s13/FinanceCenterStage.pdf;	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  De	  Grauwe,	  The	  Governance	  of	  a	  Fragile	  Eurozone,	  45	  Australian	  Economic	  
Review	  255	  (September	  2012);	  S.	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  &	  G.B.Wolff,	  Banking	  and	  Sovereign	  Risk	  in	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  Euro	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  7833	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  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  Greece:	  Ex	  Post	  Evaluation	  of	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  Under	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  2010	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finances showed among other things diminished capacity to support the banking sector.48 An 
early and stark illustration of the loop dynamic came from Ireland.  
 
1.40 At the height of the global financial crisis in 2008, Ireland’s financial system buckled under 
the weight of bad real estate loans. When it collapsed, the system stood at eight times the size 
of the Irish economy. Partly under external pressure, the government extended a blanket 
guarantee to all Irish bank liabilities, nationalized a large bank and recapitalized much of the 
remaining banking system, bringing about partial nationalization. A national asset 
management company bought distressed real estate assets off bank books, and replaced them 
with government debt. Irish government debt stock rose from 25% of GDP in 2007 to nearly 
120% in 2012.49 Some estimated the government’s contingent liabilities at over 200% of 
GDP.50 Economic fallout from the crisis would have pushed up Irish government debt in any 
case; the bank rescue tipped it into dangerous territory.51 Even as guarantees expired and 
bank restructuring proceeded apace, nearly a third of all Irish bank loans were nonperforming 
in 2012—by far the highest level in Europe.52  
 
1.41 At first, the Irish case was seen primarily as one of bailouts gone wrong. Ireland and Iceland, 
whose financial systems imploded at about the same time, showed that bank bailouts could 
sink government finances. Iceland drew the line on guarantees to protect its own; Ireland did 
not—perhaps could not. In both countries, insolvencies across an outsize banking sector were 
bound to have a spectacular impact on public finances, even though both countries started 
with low government debt. In Iceland, the distribution battles between the government and its 
banks took place largely behind the wall of capital controls. Irish banks remained 
internationally active, and soon fell victim to the debt problems of the government that saved 
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them. On learning that they had to pay extra to pledge their government debt as collateral for 
European clearing houses, Irish banks chose instead to dump their sovereign bondst.53 
 
1.42 Europe, and Ireland in particular, holds the dubious prize for testing the ultimate implications 
of bank-government ties. Where neither banks, nor governments, can fully cushion each 
other’s falls; where no fairy godmother materializes with transfers or deep-pocketed creditors 
from abroad; and where governments are committed to avoid default and maintain open 
capital flows, the link between banks and governments becomes a suicide pact—or the Doom 
Loop.  
 
Conclusions 
 
1.43 The case studies in this essay illustrate some ways in which bank-government links operate 
in crisis. Three themes recur. First, banks and governments appear to be indispensable 
partners in one another’s crises. The relationship holds with or without “twin” bank-
government crises, which are rare, and apart from the feedback “doom loop.” In particular, 
bank and government liabilities seem to migrate easily between bank and government books 
as the crisis deepens, and as part of its resolution. Second and related, private bank balance 
sheets emerge as public policy conduits. Japan and Korea highlight the fact that this function 
is not limited to crisis; however, it becomes particularly stark in crisis. Banks sprout new 
assets and liabilities, which might be valued in brand new ways in the name of financial 
stability. Third, when banks are internationally active, they come to mediate distribution of 
losses among governments. Governments want private creditors to bear the consequences of 
their risk-taking, but feel compelled to shield their own nationals, and try to get other 
governments to pick up the tab. 
  
1.44 Policy response to this abiding link between banks and governments is a mix of palliative 
and denial. It starts with a story of the relationship as a symptom of under-development and 
crisis, one of aberration and redemption. Reforms are then sold as projects for getting banks 
off government dole and getting governments out of banking—as in the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
promise that taxpayers “shall bear no losses” from bailing out insolvent banks,54 and the 
European banking union’s  “imperative to break the vicious cycle between banks and 
sovereigns.”55 Such statements are misleading at best: Dodd-Frank elaborates the process by 
which governments may support a broader range of financial institutions, while Europe 
substitutes the regional government for national ones in the bank-government marriage. Both 
try to limit government support for financial institutions and other governments, and to raise 
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its price ex ante. This is renegotiation, not divorce—and properly so, since attempts to 
renounce bailouts by rule have yet to survive a crisis.56 Still, there remains the relationship 
that dare not speak its name.  
 
1.45 Acknowledging the pervasive and enduring nature of bank-government ties reframes the 
policy task. Instead of outlawing bailouts, the focus shifts to the precise terms of loss-sharing 
between banks and governments, and among governments, in crisis – and the incentive 
effects of this allocation in good times. Decisions about the terms of the bargain must be 
intelligible to the public and democratically accountable, if only because of their enormous 
consequences for distribution, in good times and bad. The democratic imperative in turn 
raises a host of research and policy questions. For example, to what extent should 
government promises of support for banks—and banks’ tacit backing of governments—be 
made explicit on bank and government balance sheets? Should bank and government claims 
on one another occupy a special place in the claims hierarchy—and if yes, what should that 
place be? Should regulatory privileges for government debt be abolished—or made more 
explicit and institutionalized? Considering the limits on the enforcement of government 
promises (amply demonstrated elsewhere in this volume), what is the right commitment 
device to ensure that governments deliver on their promises of debt repayment, liquidity 
support, and recapitalization—and that banks pay a fair price for the benefits they receive? 
How might government commitments to one another (for example, to share losses in cross-
border bank resolution) fare in such a newly transparent regime? And how might the answers 
to such questions affect the structure of the financial sector, and the behavior of banks and 
governments going forward? 
 
1.46 The answers are far beyond the scope of this essay. For now, describing the bank-
government relationship with its cross-border dimensions as something other than an 
aberration to be stamped out or swept under the rug might prompt a more humble look at 
crisis management and regulation. Reforming the relationship to limit its worst dysfunctions, 
and to render it intelligible and accountable to the public in whose name it exists, will take 
more than official declarations. Harnessing its stabilizing potential is an even bigger 
challenge.  “Walking back from Cyprus” will take a while—and, on the bright side, many 
more drafts in Arial 12. 
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